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ABSTRACT
In the period of Turkey’s candidacy to the European Union (EU), many heated
debates continue to take place which are related to welfare effects of being in a
common market. In this thesis we analyzed a selected sample of the European Union
Law cases about Single Market and Four Freedoms with an economic approach. We
developed simple models of free movement of goods, free trade, and free movement
of workers; we discussed the welfare effects of these movements for countries and for
the entire Union. We also gave examples of reference cases, and discussed the effects
of such decisions in the European Court of Justice. In addition, there is a special
focus on intellectual property rights, the concept of patent, and its effects on free
trade since they are important topics in Law and Economics literature from which
many discussions arise. In addition, an overview of EU law making process and a
historical background of the Single Market and economic integration of the EU is
provided in this thesis. We also discussed some views about main stream economics
in which trade liberalization and factors of production mobility is always assumed as
improving welfare. We concluded stating that even free trade and free movement of
workers are beneficial in theory; both are important topics for which well-established
policy applications are required.
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AVRUPA TEK PAZAR DAVALARININ EKONOMI˙K I˙NCELEMESI˙
I˙lke Toygu¨r
Ekonomi, MA Tezi, 2009
Prof. Dr. Mehmet Bac¸
Anahtar Kelimeler: Tek Pazar, Do¨rt Serbesti, Serbest Ticaret, Fikri Mu¨lkiyet
Hakları, AB Hukuku Davaları
O¨ZET
Tu¨rkiye’nin Avrupa Birlig˘i (AB) ile mu¨zakere su¨recini su¨rdu¨rdu¨g˘u¨ s
"
u gu¨nlerde
tek pazarın bir parc¸ası olmanın refaha etkileri o¨nemli bir tartıs
"
ma konusudur. Bu
tezde Tek Pazar ve Do¨rt Serbesti ile ilgili Avrupa Toplulug˘u Hukuku’nda yer alan
davaların bazıları ekonomik bir yaklas
"
ımla incelenmis
"
tir. Malların ve is
"
c¸ilerin serbest
dolas
"
ımı ve yerles
"
me hakkı u¨zerine temel birer modelleme yapılmıs
"
, bunun o¨zelinde
u¨lkeler genelinde tu¨m Birlik ic¸in refah etkileri incelenmis
"
tir. Avrupa Toplulug˘u
Adalet Divanı’nın referans kararlarına atıfta bulunulmus
"
tur. Bunların yanısıra fikri
mu¨lkiyet hakları konusu, o¨zellikle patent kavramı, literatu¨rde yarattıg˘ı temel nite-
likteki tartıs
"
malar nedeniyle daha detaylı olarak incelenmis
"
tir. Avrupa Birlig˘i’nde
yasa yapma prosedu¨ru¨; Avrupa’nın ekonomik entegrasyonu ve Tek Pazar’ın olus
"
umu
konusunda bilgi verilmis
"
tir. Bu c¸alıs
"
mada, her ne kadar malların ve is
"
c¸ilerin serbest
dolas
"
ımı teoriken refahı arttırsa da, daha detaylı politika uygulamaları gerektirmek-
tedir sonucuna varılmaktadır.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction - Outline of the Thesis
In the period of Turkey’s candidacy to the European Union, many discussions
continue to rise, which are related to welfare effects of being in a common market, not
only in Turkey but also in other Member States. The free movement of goods, since
Turkey already has a Customs Union for industry products, is an important debate
which has been going on for years. However, it is more focused on free movement
of workers and right of establishment, because people are more concerned about
welfare and security implications of this freedom. Since moving to another state is
costly in many ways (social, economic, cultural and linguistic) for most of the people,
costly for the host country (migration policies required) as well, the European Union
Law needed to regulate this process in detail. A large number of cases have been
discussed since the establishment of common market. In this thesis we used an
economic approach to common market and free movement concepts, tried to model
them and analyze the welfare effects. The aim of this thesis is to discuss the decisions
towards free movement of goods with a special focus on intellectual property rights;
free movement of workers and right of establishment with an economic approach.
The thesis starts with the introduction - outline of the thesis, then explains the
relationship between law and economics, EU law and legal system. In the second
chapter, titled Creation of Single Market and the Concept of Four Freedoms, we
are trying to give a historical overview for the creation of single market and then
explain the concept of four freedoms in detail. Chapter 3, titled On the Free Move-
ment of Goods, focuses on the welfare implications of free movement of goods via
a Ricardian Comparative Advantage model. In this model, we show how welfare
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of countries increase with trade liberalization. We show production and consump-
tion of two countries for the case of autarky and for free trade, and show that both
consumption and production increase with specialization on country’s comparative
advantage good. This chapter continues with short summaries of reference cases
which constituted articles, reshaped policies in member states.
As we mentioned before, an additional aim of law and economics is to give
policy advices to legal authorities depending on economic theory. Their main focus is
on the implications which are able to restrict competition and regulate free markets.
From this point of view, the arguments about intellectual property rights become very
important. Because in member states, policies about patents, trade marks and such
affect the possibility of arbitrage, which affects the process of markets and creates
inequalities between countries. For this reason, we focused on a case named Sterling
Drug v. Centrafarm, to show different details about intellectual property rights
and arbitrage in markets after mentioning the importance of intellectual property
rights. These analysis are followed by couple of more cases similar to Sterling Drug
v. Centrafarm.
Our Chapter 4, named On the Free Movement of Workers, Freedom of Es-
tablishment and Free Movement of Services. We simply modeled free movement of
labors both for high skilled and low skilled workers and showed free movement of
labor is beneficial for both countries. In addition, we mentioned some reasons behind
the logic for opposing free movement. As the previous chapter, chapter 4’s model is
followed by some example cases. Chapter 5 presents the conclusion.
1.2 European Union Law and Economic Approach
of Law
In general, law and economics is the economical approach to the legal theory,
using economic theory to explain the effects of law, especially for showing the welfare
effects of legal rules. Specifically using economics to discuss the effects of laws which
tries to regulate markets is common. Any rule restricting competition or intervening
in the free market is an important discussion topic for law and economics. This
is why, in this thesis, we not only focused on four freedoms concept, but also on
intellectual property rights, all which create numerous debates.
We can discuss law and economics in two subfields: positive law and economics
and normative law and economics. Positive law and economics uses economic analysis
to predict the effects of legal rules. In addition to predicting effects, normative law
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and economics gives policy recommendations based on economic reasoning. Using
the concept of Pareto Efficiency1, economists try to advice legal implications which
can maximize welfare for the people of the country (or for the Union in this case).
There is an important criticism, especially for normative law and economics. Since
most of the economists follow the mainstream, neoclassical economics, their policy
recommendations are also based on that framework. So the basic critics which apply
to those works in theory, are applied to work in law and economics as well. The main
criticism is focused on the simplifying assumptions of Rational Choice Theory, which
makes the analysis regardless of real human nature; and for giving so few importance
to the concepts such as human rights and distributive justice.
The Law and Economics on European Union is also an important field, since
the main idea behind the establishment of European Economic Community with
the 1957 Treaty of Rome, was to unify six nations as an economic area. Economic
integration deepened step by step through the years. Implementing and maintaining
a unified economic area requires a legal system of some kind since disputes over
interpretation and conflicts among various laws became inevitable[2].
Before starting the economic discussion, we should introduce the factors of
legislation in the EU. EC2 law constitutes from Treaties (primary law), EU laws
(secondary law) and case law. More in detail, there are several Treaties which to-
gether represent the primary law of the European Union, its constitutional base[7];
then the relations between the actors (European Commission, the Council and Par-
liament), according to their roles coming from Treaties, determine secondary law;
and finally the decisions of the Court create the case law.
1.2.1 EU Law Making - Primary Law
There are several treaties which work together to make the primary law of Eu-
ropean Union, create the institutions, define their roles and decision making process.
These treaties are binding obligations for the States, since European Community
legislation stands over national laws. There are Treaties constitutes EU, which are
designed by the Member States and ratified at national level; there are Accession
Treaties (treaties signed with candidate states) and International Treaties (treaties
signed with third countries and international institutions).
The Treaty of Paris (1951) which set up the European Coal and Steel Commu-
1An allocation is Pareto efficient if it is feasible and there is no other feasible allocation that can
make one household better off without making any other worse off.
2Here we use EC, European Community, for the first pillar, and European Union, for three
pillars.
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nity (ECSC)is the first such Treaty. The need for further cooperation in economic
field lead to the establishment of European Economic Community (EEC), with the
Treaty of Rome signed in 1957. Also the Treaty founded European Atomic Energy
Community (Euratom), which controls the peaceful use of nuclear power. All these
Communities were run by a Commission (ECSC by a High Authority), had one
European Assembly (later the European Parliament) and a Court of Justice in com-
mon. The High Authority and the two Commissions were merged into one European
Commission by the Merger Treaty in 1965[7].
For understanding the necessity of Single European Act (SEA) in 1986, we
should look over the period up to that. There are three main points which proved the
need for a new Treaty. First of all unanimity voting in the Council blocked decisions
for a long time, so a change was required to implement majority voting. Secondly
the oil crises in 1973-74 period hit the Community hard, so Member States decided
to deal with internal market issues. And finally with the enlargement process, it
was so obvious that more members meant more diverse interests, again showed the
need for the change of voting system. Finally SEA 1986, which came into force on 1
July 1987, introduced more specific single market objectives, to be achieved by the
increased use of qualified majority voting. A new process with greater involvement
of the European Parliament was introduced in the form of the cooperation procedure
and it was given a power of veto over accession of new Member States. The SEA
also provided for the eventual creation of a Court of First Instance (CFI) to take
over some of the jurisdiction of the Court and removed the non-tariff barriers[7].
This was followed by the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in 1992 (in the
inter-governmental conference (IGC) in Maastricht) signed, which entered in force in
1993. The most important achievement of TEU is the introduction of Economic and
Monetary Union. Then the need for more institutional reform created the necessity
of another treaty, The Treaty of Amsterdam (signed June 1997, entered into force 1
May 1999). However even with the new Treaty the question of changing institutions
and procedures was not solved, and the enlargement problem was brought on the
table as well. Another IGC convened in Nice in 2001 (the Treaty entered in the force 1
February 2003), especially to get ready for enlargement, to the determine the number
of seats and votes per country under the qualified majority voting (QMV)3 system.
Also QMV was extended to cover more areas with the Nice Treaty. After Treaty
of Nice became operational, new attempts for preparing a constitutional treaty has
3A qualified majority (QM) is the number of votes required in the Council for a decision to be
adopted when issues are being debated on the basis of Article 205(2) of the EC Treaty. (Source:
EUROPA Glossary)
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started. It failed, its content rewritten under the name of Treaty of Lisbon (Reform
Treaty) which was signed in 2008. Ratification process is not completed yet, waiting
for Ireland and Czech Republic.
The summary of European Law history clearly shows us the bargaining process
of Member States over the Treaties. The necessity of change is observed with the
encountered problems, especially through the enlargement process. Today Europe is
waiting for its Constitution.
1.2.2 EU Law Making - Secondary Law
Secondary law is made by the actors in the system, so called three EU in-
stitutions: European Commission, Council and Parliament. To be precise, we can
say that secondary law also has it’s source from Treaties since those Treaties deter-
mine actors, relations between these actors and the decision making procedure. The
binding Community acts are regulations, directives and decisions. There are also
non-binding acts, which are recommendations or opinions[7].
Both Commission and Parliament are supranational institutions. Commission-
ers are nominated by national governments, appointed by Council (by the approval
of Parliament). The Members of Parliament (MEPs) are directly elected by citi-
zens of each Member States for five years. The Council, as an intergovernmental
institution, consists of ministers, officials and diplomats for different policy areas.
A decision making process simply starts from the proposal of the Commission,
which meets in close sessions and decides by simple majority vote. This proposal
delivers to General Secretariat of the Council and they forward this to the Committee
of Permanent Representatives (Coreper). The proposals are needed to be approved
in Coreper, for being debated in the related special committee of the Council. There
are two different Corepers; Coreper I deals with technical matters, while Coreper II
deals with political matters. They examine the proposal and decide how is it going
to be presented to the Council. If Coreper submits the proposal as ”A-Point”, it
means it is approved unanimously and need to be taken as primary issue; if it is
”B-Point” it means it needs more discussion4. In addition in the process, depending
on the roles in the Treaties, European Parliament’s consent, assent or amendment
is required. Similar to the working groups of Coreper, relevant committee in the
Parliament prepares a report, it is voted by the MEP’s and then if it is approved it
is presented to the Commission. It still depends on the Commission to consider or
not to consider these opinions. The process continues with the voting of the proposal
4For more information visit www.ikv.org.tr.
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in the related committee of the Council either for the legislation of a new EU law or
for rejection of the proposal.
Here we tried to clarify the decision making process as simple as possible. There
are different legislative procedures depending on the subject. Also there are many
discussions about the roles of the institutions. The aim of these information is to give
an overview of the law making in the EU, so we will not be explaining procedures
(consultation, cooperation, assent and co-decision) in detail5.
1.2.3 EU Law Making - Case Law
The Community law has its sources not only from European Treaties and the
acts and decisions of the institutions, but also from the cases relating to the appli-
cation of this primary and secondary law. European Court of Justice (ECJ)6 is the
highest authority on matters related to the interpretation of EC law. In addition,
the decisions of the Court comprimises the rules of international law and general
principles of law[12]. The Court is responsible for equal application of the EU Law
across the Member States. It has no authority in the decisions of national courts,
however national courts refer to ECJ for subjects related to EU law. Decisions of
the Court created the base for the creation of many Directives. In addition, with the
Single European Act (1987) a Court of First Instance was attached to the European
Court of Justice. The Court of First Instance began to hear cases in 1989. They are
both hearing cases and giving decisions for ensuring the overall application of the
EU law
In this thesis we will comment on case law on the behalf of some specific cases,
with an economical approach. After modeling basic freedoms in single market, we
will give some important cases as examples.
5For more information: John Peterson and Michael Shackleton, ”The Institutions of the Euro-
pean Union”, Oxford, 2002.
6ECJ will be referred as Court during this thesis for the sake of simplicity.
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Chapter 2
CREATION OF SINGLE
MARKET AND THE CONCEPT
OF FOUR FREEDOMS
In this chapter, we will try to explain why European Union has decided to
facilitate free movement in its territories. First, we will explain different levels of
market integration intensity and its historical progress for Europe, then we will
explain the concept of four freedoms in detail.
2.1 Creation of Single Market - A Historical Overview
When several regions get integrated into a single political entity, many issues
arise because of the asymmetries across those regions[15]. Regions differ in size,
physical capital, worker endowment (and even in their weights on political affairs)
etc. This reality creates the need for a single market, to overcome these difficulties
arise from regional differences. Economic integration had been given a specific def-
inition by economists specializing in international trade to denote a state of affairs
or a process which involves the amalgamation of separate economies into larger free
trading regions [6].
The creation of the European Single Market has its roots back in 1952, when
first integration steps were taken in the formation of the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC). Five years later, European Economic Community was estab-
lished with the Treaty of Rome (also know as the Treaty establishing the European
Community (TEC)). The Treaty introduced the main economic goals and integration
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initiatives among the original six members. The main logic was to create an area in
which firms and consumers have equal opportunities to sell or buy goods; the owners
of capital and labor have equal opportunities to employ their resources[2]. Back
then, the intention was to create the politic integration throughout the economic
one.
There are some steps which are required to be mentioned on the way leading to-
day’s Union, like the removing of all tariffs on intra-EEC trade; adopting a common
tariff on imports from third nations; labor mobility; capital market integration and a
range of common policies. The foundation of the analysis of various types of regional
economic integration was established by economists who investigated the early at-
tempts by Western European countries to engineer regional economic integration[13]
We will try to talk about these steps for creating the necessary background for the
rest of the thesis, starting with an explanatory table for different stages of integra-
tion.
Table 2.1: Different Stages of Integration
*Free Trade Area (FTA) - Member States remove all impediments to free movement
of goods among themselves but each state retains its autonomy to regulate its trading
relations with non-Member States;
*Customs Union (CU) - FTA + common external policy in respect of non-Member
States (e.g. single customs tariff);
*Common Market (CM) - CU + free movement of persons, services, and capital;
*Monetary Union (MU) - CM + single currency;
*Economic Union - MU + single monetary and fiscal policy controlled by a central
authority;
*Political Union (PU) - Economic Union + central authority sets not only monetary
and fiscal policies but is responsible to a central parliament with the sovereignty of a
nation’s government. Such a parliament might also set foreign and security policies;
*Full Union (FU) - the complete unification of the economies involved and a common
policy on matters such as social security, income tax.
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In theory, the liberalization of all factors of production secures the optimum
allocation of labor and capital. However in real life, markets are not characterized
by perfect competition, factors are not perfectly mobile, and countries are differently
endowed with natural resources. Even if we can prove the welfare improving effects
of free markets in theory, there still is a need for further discussion. Keeping this in
mind, we will try to explain the economic integration of Europe.
At first glance, the term ”single market” appears narrower than ”common
market” because single market is defined by reference only to the four freedoms (free
movement of persons, services and capital, coupled with the right of establishment)
while the common market combines the four freedoms with the flanking measures
such as agriculture, competition and social matters. In reality, the realization of
single market is dependent on policy actions, including competition and social policy,
that is why more likely the terms common, single and internal market are largely
synonymous[3].
First step for further economic integration can easily be stated as removing
barriers for free trade. Even if tariffs and quotas have been removed quickly1, these
were not the only restrictions for free trade. Non-tariff barriers stayed in place longer.
In addition, the necessity for harmonization of trade policies towards third countries
was so obvious, otherwise trade could never be truly free2. Also the other com-
mon restrictions (such as health and safety standards) are also required to be met.
Ensuring undistorted competition was critical as well (prohibiting unfair subsidies
for national producers; common competition policy; national law and national tax
harmonization). According to this, state aids, unfair practices such as price-fixing
agreements, exclusive purchasing deals (i.e. cartels) were prohibited. National laws,
especially which have effects on common market, were harmonized. Since different
taxation policies can have direct or indirect impacts on competition, they have been
harmonized as well.
After defining the rules for free movement of goods, unrestricted trade in ser-
vices put on the agenda for further discussion. Even if the main principles of this
freedom was embraced with the Treaty of Rome, application required many govern-
ment regulations. The most important difference here is, service providers are people
whose qualifications may differ a lot from each other, which creates the need for the
standardization of education and training for people who will provide any kind of
service in another country.
Free movement of goods and services along with the rules for nondiscrimina-
1For more information, Article 3a
2For more information, Article 3b
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tory practices are necessary conditions for market integration; however they are not
sufficient. Labour and capital market integration is required for creating a unified
economic area3. We will discuss the effects of free movement of labour in the coming
pages. In addition capital market integration can be divided into two types: right of
establishment (capital for setting up, becoming partner or such for a business ) and
financial capital. Capital market liberalization became a reality thirty years later
with the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty[2]. Coming discussions
were fix exchange rate policy and macroeconomic coordination; policies about a cru-
cial area, agriculture - also as a political tool, took place for years. As a summary,
the Treaty of Rome stated main aspects of economic integration, even if it was a bit
weak for social policies. The main reason behind this weakness was the unclarified
scope of the social policies which directly affect the lives of citizens. There are differ-
ent ideas about harmonization of social policies between the Member States. Debate
continued in an academical platform as well, while some defends the harmonization
before liberalization, and the others rely on the power of the market. This topic
requires deeper discussion, which will not take place in this work.
Figure 2.1. shows the European economic integration with two indices, the BN
index and the DFFM index4. Even if the indices differ in details they both show the
main waves of the ongoing integration process. The period between 1958-68 named
as Customs Union formation; 1973-86 Euro pessimism; 1986-1992 Single Market and
1993-2001 EMU (to 2009 as well)[2].
As we mentioned before, since the early 1970s, formation and adaptation to new
conditions caused by European economic integration took place while economic per-
formance was good in Europe. The first enlargement took place in 1972, and United
Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark joined the EU. During those years the global fixed
exchange rate regime (Bretton Woods System) broke down, leading the Europeans
to not only restore their own monetary arrangements, but also to fight with sharp
rises in oil prices. These were the years filled by exchange rate crises, falling income
levels, rising inflation rates etc. Europeans were erecting new barriers to trade for
protecting their own economies, such as technical regulations and standards. There
were many discussions about these technical barriers to trade (TBTs) and other
restrictions for common market.
In 1979, European Monetary System (EMS) implemented. There are three
main futures of the EMS: (1)the European Currency Unit (ECU), (2)the Exchange
Rate Mechanism (ERM), and (3)the credit mechanisms[1]. This initiation created
3For more information, Article 3c
4Source: Baldwin (2006).
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Figure 2.1: Indices of European Economic Integration
many obligations to Member States for adapting their economies, for creating strong
currencies.
Here we need to point one important aspect behind these discussions. During
all these decisions, unanimity was required. This voting system slowed down so
many rulings (even stopped them for a while as an ”empty chair” policy). First
Luxembourg Compromise, French demanded political agreement, attempted; then
Single European Act (1986) restored the majority voting, which opened way for
further economic integration. These years, from 1973 to 1986, were the years of
europessimism.
The most important political change during these years was the adaptation
of democratic governments in Spain, Portugal and Greece. This lead to the second
and third enlargements, Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986) respectively. In
an effort to counter this, Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission,
proposed the next step in European integration, a single market, and pushed the
programme which will complete the internal market: The Single Market Programme.
According to the White Paper prepared by the British Commissioner Lord Cockfield,
three principal obstacles to the completion of a single market could be identified as:
physical barriers to trade, technical barriers to trade, and fiscal barriers to trade.
The Single European Act (SEA), the first significant Treaty of Rome amendment
in 1986, came into effect in 1987, and provided the necessary means to achieve
these objectives. Some of the important steps taken were: elimination of border
12
formalities; harmonization of VAT rates; mutual recognition of technical standards;
removal of capital controls to increase capital market integration.
With the Single European Act much deeper economic integration was promised
among EU members, this made the other nations feel threatened, especially the
EFTA countries. This leaded to more discussions, new applications to EU and new
enlargement attempts. Also new bilateral trade agreements started to be discussed.
The European integration continued with The Maastricht Treaty, 1992, which
provided the powers to achieve economic (which requires high degree of co-ordination
of economic policy) and monetary union (which requires the currencies of the Member
States to be either linked trough fixed exchange rates, or the circulation of one
common currency). It required Member States to conduct their economic policies
with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Community
and in the context of the broad economic guidelines laid down annually by the
council5. Monetary policy was also dealt with, and applied to those countries which
have satisfied the criteria for the single currency and have not opted out of the
process. Three years after Maastricht Treaty has been signed, the fourth enlargement
took place, Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU.
Preparation for eastern enlargement required the reform in both institutions
and procedures. Treaty of Amsterdam and Treaty of Nice have been signed as we
explained in detail in the previous chapter. In 2004, ten new countries (Czech Re-
public, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta and
Cyprus) joined the EU. The most important aspect of the enlargement of the Euro-
pean Union in 2004 is the expanded market for trade among the member countries
that has been created[14].
2.2 The Concept of Four Freedoms
The Four Freedoms are the fundamental concepts of the single market. Not
only goods but also factors of production are allowed to move freely between member
states. The main reasoning behind a common market is to increase competition
among producers, increase specialization as we will discuss in detail in the next
chapter, and give the chance to enjoy economies of scale.
These four freedoms; free movement of goods, free movement of people (and
citizenship) including free movement of workers and freedom of establishment, free
movement of capital and free movement of services are quite important for removing
5For more information, Article 98.
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barriers between member states. This has not only economic implications but also
increases social interactions between nations, which might have an improving effect
for deeper social integration in Europe.
If we want to explain them more in detail, the exercise of free movement of
goods removes all the custom duties, charges, taxes; any quantitative restrictions or
any kind of discriminative implications. Free movement of people (and citizenship)
gives the right to any citizen of a nation to move to another member state, and have
the same rights as a native citizen. Free movement of workers and free movement
of capital can be denoted as free movement of factors of production. Workers are
allowed to work in another Member State, with the same rights as native citizens.
In addition any capital owner can invest (buy shares, establish a new factory, be a
partner of an existing business etc.), in any business all over the Union.
In the following sections we will discuss the free movement of goods and the
free movement of workers, freedom of establishment and free movement of services
much more in detail.
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Chapter 3
ON THE FREE MOVEMENT OF
GOODS
The discussions about free movement of goods starts with the simple question:
why is free trade important? We can answer this question by looking back to its
roots at theWealth of Nations. As the most famous classical economist Adam Smith
said, ”it is the maxim of every prudent master of a family, never to attempt to make
at home what it will cost him more to make than to buy...What is prudence in the
conduct of every private family, can scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom.”[17].
We are able to generalize this individual advantage to nations. Basically we can state
as free trade leads to specialization, specialization will drive us to produce what we
can produce the best - in which we have comparative advantage. This will lead to
economies of scale which means the most efficient use of scarce resources. In this
chapter we will use the theory of Comparative Advantage [16] which tries to explain
how trade allows different countries with different resources (and workforce, climate
etc...) to concentrate on what they do the best, as in our reference model. According
to this model, we will show the welfare implications of free trade, and summarize
the basic EU Law cases in this issue. In the light of the information of the previous
chapter, we will analyze the steps towards a more integrated economy in Europe.
3.1 A Reference Model - Ricardian Comparative
Advantage
One of the most basic models that can explain the welfare improving effects
of free trade is The Ricardian Model[11]. In this model there are two countries
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(both of them are member states; lets say France and Germany as in the Cassis de
Dijon Case), producing two goods, using one factor of production. This is a general
equilibrium model in which all markets are perfectly competitive. It also assumes
that output is homogenous across all firms (for the sake of simplicity).
Suppose that the two countries are indexed i = 1 and 2; and two goods are
indexed j = A and B. Let labor be the only factor of production and let the quantity
of each good produced in a country be determined according to:
QiA =
LiA
aiLA
(3.1)
and
QiB =
LiB
aiLB
. (3.2)
Here, QiA represents quantity of good A produced in both countries. L
i
A is the
amount of labor applied to Good A production in both countries. aiLA represents
the unit-labor requirement for Good A in both countries. Similar variables can be
defined for good B as well.
In addition we have the feasibility condition:
LiA + L
i
B = L
i, (3.3)
where Li is the total labor endowment in both countries. The model assumes that
goods can be transported between countries at no cost.
Production functions can be written as:
LiA = a
i
LAQ
i
A
and
LiB = a
i
LBQ
i
B
which implies
aiLAQ
i
A + a
i
LBQ
i
B = L
i.
Following this information the comparative advantage concept can be defined
as:
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a1LA
a1LB
<
a2LA
a2LB
which states that Country 1 has a comparative advantage to Country 2 on production
of Good A. It means that if one country produces Good A comparatively better than
the other one, it should allocate all its resources of production (in this case just labor)
to this good and buy the other good from the other country. This will lead to the
efficient allocation of scarce resources, maximizing the welfare of consumers’ in both
countries.
There are two ways to assess welfare effects of trade in Ricardian model: real
wage effects and aggregate welfare effects. The first way evaluates the real wages of
all workers moving from autarky to free trade by using purchasing power compar-
isons. The second way is to use an aggregate welfare function to show the effects on
production and consumption efficiency. We will follow up the second way and show
the welfare effects with the help of indifference curves.
Figure 3.1. compares free trade equilibrium with autarky equilibrium for two
countries. Country 1’s PPF is given by the line 11’, while Country 2’s PPF is given
by 22’ line. We assume that countries have the same aggregate preferences which
can be represented by the indifference curves as in the figure. Let both countries
have the same size labor force. In this case the relative positions of the PPF lines
imply that Country 1 has an absolute advantage in the production Good A, which
also imply a comparative advantage.
For Country 1, autarky production and consumption points are determined
where the indifference curve (which is written as iAUT ) is tangent to PPF, which is
shown by a in the figure. When countries decide to open for free trade, Country 1’s
new equilibrium is set at point c. Country 1 specialized in production of Good A,
its comparative advantage good, and buys Good B from Country 2. For free trade
aggregate utility corresponds to the indifference curve iFT . Since iFT lies on the
right hand side of iAUT , we can conclude that national welfare rises when Country 1
moves to free trade.
For Country 2, we can find the autarky production and consumptions levels at
the point where the aggregate indifference curve is tangent to the PPF, point A in
the figure. When free trade occurs, Country 2 starts to produce Good B, and buys
Good A from Country 1. New aggregate utility corresponds to indifference curve
IFT , new equilibrium occurs at point C. Since both the indifference curve IFT and
point C lies on the right hand side of IAUT and point A respectively, we can conclude
that welfare rises in Country 2 when they move to free trade.
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Figure 3.1: Free Trade Expands Consumption Possibilities
This means that free trade will raise aggregate welfare for both countries rela-
tive to autarky. Both countries are better off with free trade. Both Country 1 and
2 benefit from economies of scale and use its resources more efficiently.
On the other hand, we want to point out one more important consequence
which will arise from this kind of production system. If each of the two countries
produces a single good in their home country and buys the other ”necessity” from the
neighbor, this means that they are much more interdependent now. This hopefully
creates peace, as also Jean Monnet expected.
Similar to the many other economic models, Comparative Advantage Model
also assumed that there are lots of rational buyers and sellers, so that, there is perfect
competition, full information, no cost of transaction, entrance and exit to the market
is easy, and contracts are credible. For the real world, not only do these assumptions
generally fail to hold, but also states interventions are common. These national state
interventions can be more destructive for transnational markets. The reason behind
this is the possibility of national authorities focusing on local concerns, possibly
ignoring the international needs. At that point, decisions made by governments,
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instead of a supranational authority, may not be able to serve all country’s best
interest. To prevent this, there must be common rules to regulate common markets.
The need for common regulation brings us to the regional approach to trade
liberalization. The European Union is a full-fledged customs union. There are no
trade barriers between its members; they have a common external tariff on their
trade with other countries; and they speak with a single voice in trade negotiations[9].
Here we should also emphasize the trade creation and trade diversion outcomes of
a customs union[18]. Trade creation means, trade, which would not have existed if
there was no free trade area, created. For example Country 1 starts to buy Good A
from Country 2 instead of producing it at home. Trade diversion is a Member State
starts to import from another Member State which is less efficient instead of a more
efficient third country. If trade creation effect is dominant, the welfare of members of
a custom union will collectively increase. Even if a country suffers, the other’s gain
will outweigh. However if trade diversion is dominant, the collective welfare of union
may decrease collectively. Calculation of trade diversion and creation effects can
be another method of welfare analysis of more economic integration as well. There
are many other discussions about if free trade is welfare improving for all kind of
countries, for instance for a small country[10], we will not be discussing this issue in
this thesis.
3.2 The Reference Cases
After analyzing a basic model of international trade, we will continue with
reference cases. Throughout the evolution of the EU law, there are some cases
which created the base of Articles, becoming reference for many oncoming cases.
In the following subsections we try to mention some of them to increase the basic
understanding on the issue[19].
3.2.1 Dassonville
In the Dassonville Case1, also known as the Dassonville formula, it has been
concluded that any disparities between legal systems of member states of the Com-
munity cannot hinder, directly or indirectly - actually or potentially, the intra-
community trade. This hindrance may not arise from discrimination against im-
ports, but simply from law of the home country. Still it can be named dual burden
of laws, because imports are not only subject to the national laws of the country in
1Case 8/74 [1974]
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which they have produced, but also those of the trading partner. This case opened
the way of application of Dassonville formula regardless of the need for suggestion
for discrimination.
3.2.2 Cassis de Dijon
The original name of this case is Rewe-Zentrale v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung
fu¨r Branntwein2 while it is more commonly known as Cassis de Dijon (which is a
blackcurrant liqueur produced in France). This case is the point of origin of Court’s
approach to market-partitioning rules that makes no distinction between domestic
and imported goods. This liqueur is commonly taken with white wine and contains 15
to 20 per cent alcohol. The German law sets the alcohol percentage of this category
to 32 per cent. This led to a restriction on marketing the beverage, even if there
were no restrictions for the import of cassis. The point of attention here was that
the rule was not discriminatory. The rule was applied to all beverages of this kind
regardless of their country of origin; it was a technical rule. However the matter
of the case is that the rules in Germany were restricting free trade from France,
in general within countries inside the common market. Similar to the Dassonville
case, it is obvious that this is also a restriction to free trade. However Court made a
different addition here, for the alcoholic beverages, declared that member states have
regulatory independence if there are no Community rules clearly set in that area. The
German government defended their rules stating as a strategy to combat alcoholism.
However the Court indicated that whenever an objective can be achieved by a less
restrictive rule (for example labeling drinks with necessary suggestions) then a state
is not allowed to put in force its own rules. The logic behind this is, if a product -an
alcoholic beverage- has been produced and marketed in one member state, it should
be marketed in other Member States as well. This is the idea of mutual recognition,
which requires the respect for the rules of other member states.
3.2.3 Gilli and Andres
Gilli and Andres Case3 is a similar case to Cassis de Dijon. Here the product is
vinegar, the importers of vinegar from Germany are prosecuted because Italian law
prohibited the sale of vinegar unless derived from wine. The same arguments as in
Cassis Case are valid: although this is not a discrimination depending on the origin,
it is still a restriction to free trade. While apple vinegar is a produced and marketed
2Case 120/78 [1979]
3Case 788/79 [1980]
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good in Germany, it is not allowed in Italy. Since there are no Community rules on
this issue, member states were allowed to establish their own technical rules. In case
of an obstacle to trade, the state should show restrictions are necessary in order to
satisfy mandatory requirements, such as being a threat to public health.
3.3 The Importance of Intellectual Property Rights
In the previous section, we simply modeled the welfare implications of free
trade and discussed some of the reference cases and decisions. In this section we
will point out another dimension of free trade relations: Protection of intellectual
property rights (IPRs). IPRs are specific challenges to the EU, because even if they
are tools for encouraging innovation; they can be significant barriers to inter-state
trade. Relying on the rights of free movement, some firms may try to benefit from
arbitrage via decreasing prices more than they should have or may violate intellectual
property rights. The discussion starts here: Can the right to trade freely discourage
scientific development? What is the objective of protecting intellectual property?
Answering these questions, creating the optimal patent regime is an important issue
not only for countries one by one, but also for the Community as a whole. The most
important point here is finding the best strategy in which countries can benefit from
new and valuable research, without harming or restricting the competition. In other
words, the objective of intellectual property protection is to create incentives that
maximize the difference between the value gained with that intellectual property and
cost of creating it. There are different kinds of intellectual property rights such as
patents, trade marks, copyright, and design rights. We will give examples of patent
and trade mark here in this work.
For as long as laws have aimed to protect intellectual property, disputes have
raged over which works to protect, for how long, and to what extent. The main-
stream of the economic profession has generally argued that economic efficiency re-
quires government support for innovative and creative activity[4]. There were many
discussions about this in not only each member country, but also in the Union as a
whole. Throughout the years there were many cases about this, and we will examine
some of them in the following subsections.
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3.3.1 Sterling Drug v Centrafarm Case
In Centrafarm v Sterling Drug Case4 a drug called Negram, designed for the
treatment of urinary infections, has been patented by Sterling Drug under British
law and under Dutch law. The Price of pharmaceuticals in the United Kingdom
was much lower than the price in the Netherlands, largely because of the power
of National Health Service of the United Kingdom, who behaves like a bulk buyer.
Centrafarm decided to undercut the price in Netherlands by buying large stocks from
United Kingdom and exporting them. Sterling Drug tried to prevent Centrafarm
selling goods in Netherlands by relying on its exclusive rights under patent law
before the Dutch courts. The Dutch court made a reference to the European Court.
The Court stated that Sterling Drug exhausted its rights by marketing the same
product in two states, meaning that they cannot rely on their patent right anymore.
For a formal analysis we can define many scenarios. The threat of entry by a
firm such as Centrafarm should lead Sterling Drug to modify its pricing policy. With
a patent right protects from arbitrage, Sterling Drug will behave like a monopolist,
and will charge the prices P ∗N and P
∗
UK in the Netherlands and in the United Kingdom
respectively. If the law does not protect against arbitrage, as in our real life case,
there are different scenarios. The starting point here is for such an arbitrage the price
in the Netherlands plus transportation costs must be lower than price in the United
Kingdom for a profitable trade for Centrafarm. If not, entry is already blockaded
with Sterling Drug’s optimal strategy. For the states in which this condition holds,
Sterling Drug should decide on whether to preempt the entrance or accommodate
with a capacity level. In any case the threat of entry reduces Sterling Drug’s expected
profits in any given time period.
Here we are trying to analyze the case in light of economic theory, differentiating
between cases such as full protection of the patent rights - no arbitrage, and free
trade. We will model the case, and figure out the optimal prices, calculate profits
and interpret the results in the following pages.
A Formal Analysis of the Sterling Drug v Centrafarm Case
In this model there are two profit maximizing firms, Sterling Drug and Cen-
trafarm. The former is the incumbent while the latter is the potential entrant who
may seek to exploit an international price difference. Here PUK stands for price
of the drug called Negram in the United Kingdom and PN stands for price in the
4Case 15/74 [1974]
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Netherlands. We will use different superscripts for different scenarios. In the real
case, we know that PUK < PN and Centrafarm entered.
Let a be the transportation cost between the markets, and again for the real
case we infer that PUK+a < PN . Also to simplify the exposition, we assume the same
demand function in Netherlands PN = A−BQN and in the United Kingdom PUK =
A − BQUK . We denote by c for the marginal cost of Negram in the Netherlands
and c
′
in the United Kingdom, such that c
′
< c. So here we assume that these two
countries are symmetric except for their marginal costs.
We will define the general profit function as Πi = PiQi−ciQi, in which i denotes
the country, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Also the welfare function can
be described as the summation of profits and consumer surpluses, W = CSi + Πji in
which i stands for the country and j stands for the firm.
First we will analyze the static monopoly case in both countries and find
Sterling Drug’s profit maximization conditions. This corresponds to full protection
against arbitrage between the two markets. Second, we will handle the problem with
a no arbitrage constraint. Third, we will solve Sterling Drug’s profit maximization
problem without any protection against arbitrage, but under a capacity limit for
Centrafarm, assuming the latter is free to enter the UK market and export to the
Netherlands.
Full Protection Against Arbitrage in International Markets
To begin with, if we assume that central authorities are protecting Sterling
Drug’s patent rights in both countries, there is no threat of entry in these markets.
By protection, we mean a broader protection than the interpretation of the European
Courts which, in our real life case did not find any wrongfulness in the entrance of
Centrafarm. Even so, calculating optimal monopoly prices and profits for Sterling
Drug will be a useful reference for coming analysis.
Since the UK market demand is identical and the only difference between the
markets is the marginal costs, all results obtained for Netherlands market can be
extended to the UK market, with the sole difference that c should be replaced by c′.
Here Sterling Drug enjoys monopoly profits maximized by choosing PN . We
substitute QN into the profit function. Because profits are concave in PN , we can
find the optimal PN from first order condition;
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max {PNQN − cQN} = max{PN
(
A− PN
B
)
− c
(
A− PN
B
)
}
∂(
APN−P 2N−cA+cPN
B
)
∂(PN)
= 0
A− 2PN + c = 0
where PN is price level in Netherlands and QN is quantity demanded. We can find
P ∗N and Q
∗
N which represents optimal monopoly prices from this maximization as
follows;
P ∗N =
A+ c
2
(3.4)
Q∗N =
A− c
2B
(3.5)
Then if we substitute these into the profit function, the optimal monopoly
profit can be written as;
Π∗N =
(
A+ c
2
)(
A− c
2B
)
− c
(
A− c
2B
)
=
(
A− c
2
)2
1
B
(3.6)
We can also calculate the CS, which represents consumer surplus here, to obtain
the welfare function;
CS =
(
A− A+ c
2
)(
A− c
2B
)
1
2
CS =
((A− c)1
2
)2
2B
(3.7)
Here Sterling Drug enjoys monopoly profits in both countries. To promote and
encourage the innovations, it may be optimal to strictly enforce patent protection,
hence, monopoly. We will also discuss the optimal patent length and its welfare
results in the following sections.
The Problem of the Monopolist subject to ”No Arbitrage” Constraint
If the law does not protect Sterling Drug against arbitrage in international markets,
there are two possible cases:
1) Entry by firms such as Centrafarm to exploit price differentials is blockaded.
That is, given the prices and the transportation cost a, Centrafarm would never
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benefit from entry. This corresponds to the case P ∗UK + a ≥ P ∗N (We are focusing
on the possibility that outsiders such as Centrafarm can exploit a relatively high
price in Netherlands. The monopoly price in Netherlands will be larger than the UK
monopoly price because demands are identical, while c′ < c, by assumption.) Recall
that the ”starred” prices are optimal monopoly prices without any constraint in case
of full protection against arbitrage in international markets.
2) Entry is not blockaded, which happens if P ∗UK + a < P
∗
N . This corresponds
to c− c′ > 2a, the cost difference is large, so trade is profitable. Now Sterling Drug
has two choices: to accommodate Centrafarm or preempt Centrafarm. In both cases,
the profits of Sterling Drug will be smaller than those of a monopolist found in (3.6).
Here we will analyze Sterling Drug’s problem under a price differential (no
arbitrage) constraint which is (PUK+a) ≥ PN . We will try to solve this maximization
problem with creating a Lagrangian analysis, discussing if the constraint is binding or
not. If the constraint is binding, Sterling Drug will choose the prices for preemption
of arbitrage. If the constraint is not binding the entrance of Centrafarm is already
blockaded.
max(ΠN + ΠUK)
s.t. (PUK + a) ≥ PN ,
The Lagrangian of this problem is:
 L = ΠN + ΠUK + λ[PUK + a− PN ].
Since the profits are given as;
ΠN = QNPN − cQN = A− PN
B
(PN − c) = APN − Ac− P
2
N + PNc
B
ΠUK =
A− PUK
B
(PUK − c′) = APUK − Ac
′ − P 2UK + PUKc′
B
they can be substituted to the Lagrangian function:
 L =
APN − Ac− P 2N + PNc+ APUK − Ac′ − P 2UK + PUKc′
B
+ λ[PUK + a− PN ]
We have three first-order conditions, the price level in the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom which will be represented by P pN and P
p
UK , respectively. The other
first-order condition shows us λ which we will use it to analyse if the price differential
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constraint is binding.
If we take the derivative of the Lagrangian function according to PN , we can find
the optimal price level for Netherlands in which the entry of Centrafarm is preempted
(here we are assuming we are in the case which the constraint is binding.);
∂  L
∂PN
=
A− 2PN + c
B
− λ = 0
A− 2PN + c = Bλ
A+ c−Bλ
2
= P pN (3.8)
Since the countries are symmetric we can use the same process also for finding the
price level in the United Kingdom;
∂  L
∂PUK
=
A− 2PUK + c′
B
+ λ = 0
A− 2PUK + c′ = −Bλ
A+ c
′
+Bλ
2
= P pUK (3.9)
The last first-order condition is the derivative of the Lagrangian function with
respect to λ is,
∂  L
∂λ
= PUK + a− PN = 0
A+ c
′
+Bλ
2
+ a =
A+ c−Bλ
2
λ =
c− c′ − 2a
2B
(3.10)
Note that λ > 0 if and only if c − c′ > 2a, confirming the conclusion that
this condition corresponds to preemption of arbitrage. Thus when λ > 0 and the
constraint is binding, the prices are given by:
P pN = [A+ c−B(
c− c′ − 2a
2B
)]
1
2
=
2A+ c+ c
′
+ 2a
4
P pUK = [A+ c
′
+B(
c− c′ − 2a
2B
)]
1
2
=
2A+ c+ c
′ − 2a
4
Note that P pUK + a = P
p
N when λ > 0. The complementary slackness condition
is
λ[P pUK − P pN + a] = 0
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which, if [P ∗UK − P ∗N + a]>0 implies λ = 0 and the constraint is not binding. In this
case, entry is blockaded and Sterling Drug obtains monopoly profit. This corresponds
to c− c′ < 2a.
The intuition is that, if the cost difference is small, i.e., c− c′ < 2a, the prices
will be so close to each other, so the trade will not be that profitable. In this case
Sterling Drug does not need to take into account possible entry by Centrafarm. Entry
is already blockaded by Sterling Drug’s optimal strategy.
Monopolist’s Problem with a Capacity Constraint for the Entrant
Now we are going to consider the case in which Sterling Drug ”accommodates”
arbitrage opportunities. The question we are going to ask in this part of the analysis
is: how do Sterling Drug’s profits depend on the arbitrage capacity of firms like
Centrafarm? Since entry is neither blockaded nor preempted, we are in the case
where PUK + a < PN . Centrafarm can freely enter the UK market, take an amount
within its capacity and exploit the price differential to sell in the Netherlands market.
Let X denote the arbitrage capacity of firms like Centrafarm; it is impossible to ship
more than X units from the UK market to the Netherlands. The sequence of events
is as follows: first, Sterling Drug announces a price in the UK and the Netherlands.
Next, given its capacity X, Centrafarm decides a quantity Qx = X to buy from the
UK market and sell it in the Netherlands market. Clearly, as long as arbitrage is
accommodated, i.e., as long as P aUK + a < P
a
N , Centrafarm will use all its capacity
X. The product will be sold in the Netherlands at the price announced by Sterling
Drug (although alternative scenarios are admissible here). Sterling Drug gets the
residual demand, but it is this residual demand that it uses to determine the profit
maximizing price at Netherlands market.
Consider the following unconstraint maximization:
max(ΠN + ΠUK)
where
ΠUK = QUKPUK − c′QUK = A− PUK
B
(PUK − c′),
ΠN = (QN −X)PN − cQN = A− PN −BX
B
(PN − c).
The first order conditions are:
∂(ΠN + ΠUK)
∂(PUK)
= 0 ⇒ P aUK =
A+ c
′
2
, (3.11)
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∂(ΠN + ΠUK)
∂(PN)
= 0 ⇒ P aN =
A+ c−BX
2
. (3.12)
where P aUK and P
a
N represents accommodation prices in the United Kingdom and in
the Netherlands respectively.
Clearly, if X is smaller than the quantity demanded at the price PN , that is, if
X < (A−PN)/B, then Centrafarm will sell all its capacity X. Otherwise, Centrafarm
will limit its output to the demand at the price announced by Sterling drug, so that
Qx = (A−PN)/B. Given this optimal decision by Centrafarm, Sterling Drug’s sales
in the Netherlands market are determined as follows: If PN ≥ A − BX, Sterling
Drug’s sales in Netherlands is zero. If PN < A − BX, Sterling Drug’s sales in
Netherlands is given by QN = (A − PN)/B − X. As X converges to zero, Sterling
Drug’s price at Netherlands converges to the ”starred” monopoly price found earlier.
Increasing X, reduces the residual demand for Sterling Drug and accordingly the
monopoly price on that smaller market falls as well. At larger X values, the constraint
P aN ≤ P aUK fails to hold, in which Centrafarm’s entry is already blockaded.
For X in the range [0, (A - c)/B], the profits of Sterling Drug are decreasing in X.
Since the profit from accommodation of arbitrage is positive at small X, Sterling Drug
would certainly not bother the possibility of arbitrage when the entrants’ capacity
is small. It would obtain near-monopoly profits. But these profits are decreasing in
X, and as X approaches the market size of Netherlands at the marginal cost c, the
profits from Netherlands market fall to zero. For such large X values, the profits
of Sterling Drug are larger under entry prevention. In conclusion, if entry is not
blockaded, there is a critical X = Xc such that Sterling Drug prefers prevention of
arbitrage for X larger than Xc, not to modify its behavior if X < Xc.
As we explained before, the length and extent of the patent protection (the
other intellectual property rights are also similar) is an important decision. Law-
makers in countries are trying to figure out optimal strategies for not only increasing
the level of innovations but also decreasing the costs of restricted competition in the
markets. Also putting firms into a patent race to obtain the prize of protection may
not be the social optimum in every case. Two firms seeking the same patentable in-
vention can spend a lot, forcing a combined expenditure. At the same time giving the
patent right to an innovation means to record many details about product, which
may prevent others who intend to do research in the same field. In this scenario
intellectual property law lowers the costs of subsequent innovations.
Another important issue here can be the optimal patent length. Even if govern-
ments decide to protect rights of the patent holder, the length of the patent should
be decided carefully. In addition, the efficiency of the innovation the level of dissem-
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ination and how widely the innovation is going to be used, are quite important in
patent length decision.
Optimal Patent Length
What is the optimal patent regime in which costs of restricting competition are
outweighed by the benefits of innovations? For instance, if a Spanish patent holder
seeks to exclude a similar French product, why does the Court decide for the sake of
free circulation of goods inside the Community?
What is the optimal patent length such that policy makers not only secure the
innovations but also the competitiveness in markets?
Without the commercially valuable inducement of patent protection, there
would be little incentive to sink costs into the search for new gadgets, because the
profits would be seized by an imitator who might have incurred no costs.
Here we assume that we are in the case entry is not blockaded, P ∗UK + a < P
∗
N .
Let Z be the total costs of research, development and innovation, T the patent length
in years and δ, the discount factor. A company will make research and create new
products if
(ΣTt=1δ
t−1Πt) ≥ Z
The authorities must decide the optimal patent length such that the present value
of profits should be no less than the total cost of innovation. Welfare costs of the
monopolistic power are considered in the objective function of the state. This objec-
tive function must include the benefits from the innovation and the costs from the
monopoly power implied by the right of patent. In case of European Union countries
also the concepts of free movements of goods comes into stage, to limit the rights of
the patent owner.
Thus, the society’s problem is to maximize a welfare function of infinite horizon
subject to the constraint
(ΣTt=1δ
t−1Πt) ≥ Z
where it chooses the patent length T, during which the innovator obtains monopoly
profits, as well as an enforcement policy which affects Πt.
If entry is blockaded, then patent protection is unnecessary. If entry is pre-
empted, then, monopoly profits are lower than the case of blockaded entry: it may
be optimal to increase patent duration T so that the incentive constraint is satisfied
(because Pit is lower, T should be increased).
If we want to analyze the welfare effects of patent policy in Sterling Drug v
29
Centrafarm case we should discuss the topic on Sterling Drug side, Centrafarm side,
and on the side of consumers in Netherlands. This reexporting is definitely good for
Centrafarm, good for the Dutch consumers because of the decrease in the price, and
good for the general integration of the markets; but bad for the producer, also the
patent owner, Sterling Drug.
3.3.2 Hoffman la Roche v Centrafarm
A variant of the of Sterling Drug v Centrafarm case is a repackaging case
involving Hoffman la Roche v Centrafarm5. Roche held the trade mark for Valium
both in Germany and in the United Kingdom. The price in United Kingdom was
lower than the price in Germany. Here again Centrafarm decided to export Valium
from United Kingdom to Germany and earn profit from the existing price margin.
The only difference in this case is that Centrafarm decided to repack the goods into
larger boxes in Germany on which it had reprinted the Roche trade mark as well as its
own details. Roche asked the German courts to protect its Trade Mark (TM) rights,
which has the essential function of guaranteeing the identity of the trademarked
product to the consumer. The court explained that free trade prevails where three
conditions are observed: first, the repackaging does not affect the original condition of
the product; second, the owner of the right must be supplied with notice in advance of
the marketing of the repackaged product; and third, in order to protect the consumer
from being misled, it must be plain who is responsible for the repackaging. All these
requirements serve to inform the consumers about whose goods they are buying.
3.3.3 Merck v Stephar
Another example of a patent case is Merck v Stephar6, in which Merck held
a patent for a drug called ”Moduretic” in Netherlands. Merck marketed the drug
both in Netherlands and in Italy where it has no patent (in fact, no such patent
could be issued in Italy). A third party bought stocks in Italy and exported them
to Netherlands. Here it can be argued that this case differs from Centrafarm v
Sterling Drug case because there is no patent protection in one of these countries.
The Court disagreed because Merck entered the Italian market with full awareness.
Here some points comes into stage for discussion. For a policy maker is it better to
let the right holder to stick to home territory and enjoy a protected monopoly? Or
should policies encourage free trade for everybody? If the producer chooses to take
5Case 102/77 [1978]
6Case 187/80 [1981]
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advantage of wider markets, should increased competition also be accepted? If so,
how can inventions be encouraged without monopoly profits? As we also discussed
before, the patent protection length and extent is an important discussion. All
economic and social dimensions of free trade, monopolistic prices for both consumers
and producers, necessary incentives for innovation must be taken into consideration.
3.3.4 Pharmon v Hoechst
This is another example of drug-patent case involving three countries, named
Pharmon v Hoechst.7 Here Hoechst owned patents for the drug Frusemide in Ger-
many, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, according
to the Patents Act, a compulsory licence was awarded, which gives permission to
third parties of a licence to exploit the patent while paying a reasonable royalty to
the patent holder. The aim of this licence is not only rewarded the inventor but also
to make the invention much more available to the public. So Hoechst has the patent
in the UK but the third parties who are producing the drug are licensed by the State.
Pharmon bought stocks of the drug in the United Kingdom, like Centrafarm did,
produced by the licensee and then exported them to the Netherlands. The Court
decided that exercise of Hoechst’s Dutch patent was permissible, so favored national
protection against free trade. The Court decided that Hoechst had not exhausted
its rights under national patent law, different than the Centrafarm case. The Court
held that exhaustion of rights occurs only on consensual marketing.
3.3.5 Allen and Hanburys v Generics
Allen and Hanburys v Generics Case8 is an example for non-discrimination
stating even if rights have not been exhausted, it is not possible to exclude an
imported product from the market if an infringing domestic product could not be
so excluded. The product in question is a pharmaceutical product coming from a
Member State where it is not patentable9. The British patent had been adjusted
under statue so that the patent holder could no longer claim exclusivity. Other firms
could make the product, provided they paid a royalty to the patent holder. In these
cases, the Court indicated that an injunction restraining the import of an infringing
product, marketed in another state without the patent holder’s permission, could
not be awarded by an English court[19].
7Case 19/84 [1985]
8Case 434/85 [1988]
9For more information check http://eur-lex.europa.eu
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Chapter 4
ON THE FREE MOVEMENT OF
WORKERS, FREEDOM OF
ESTABLISHMENT AND FREE
MOVEMENT OF SERVICES
In this chapter we are trying to model different cases related to free movement
of workers, services and freedom of establishment. Article 39 (ex 48) confers on
workers the right of free movement between member states. Article 43 (ex 52 )
confers a similar right on the self-employed, which permits freedom of establishment.
Article 49 (ex 59) confers a right freely to provide service across borders. All three
sets of provisions serves the liberation of factors of production within the common
market[19].
The right for people to move freely from one state to the other, and the right
to establish is a distinguishing feature of a common market. In early years of the
Union these freedoms were based on a rule against discrimination on grounds of
nationality1.The rule stipulates that the immigrant enjoy the same rights as those
of a national citizen. In more recent case law, the Court focused on the removal of
restrictions to free movement. The view changed tremendously with the concept of
European Citizenship (this concept needs much more deeper analysis, which will not
take place in this thesis). Also throughout the years, EU Law has been changed for
the people who are economically active, who can bring skills to the host country and
support themselves financially. Since we are modeling workers, who will provide a
1See Article 43 (ex 52) and Article 49 (ex 59) for more information.
32
service, we assume that our migrants are economically active.
The debate is about immigrants are ”taking jobs away” from the native work-
ers. Borjas[5] offers a survey (about United States) stating that recent immigrant
waves will remain economically disadvantaged throughout their working lives. The
discussions about this issue in Europe is also similar. The most important point here
is, main logic behind the existence of the Union is equity between all citizens, also
for working conditions in every country. In addition to that there is an important de-
bate about national beliefs, norms and convictions, all which cannot be ruled out by
supranational authorities[20]. Also there are articles stating that culture plays some
general role in economic performance[8]. These are much more deeper discussions,
which will not be discussed so in detail in this work.
Here our model is focusing on self-employed people who want to establish (and
provide services) in other member states. The point here is to have the exact same
rights with the citizens of the host country. Not only rights related to establish-
ment but also access to the market for providing services are needed to be secured
by Union’s law. Establishment can also mean to start a permanent or temporary
company in another member country. The underlying reasoning for all of them is to
promote market integration, which leads to realization of economies of scale and the
stimulation of competition.
4.1 A Reference Model
This model features two countries (both of them are member states; lets say
France and Belgium as in the Thieffry v Conseil de L’Ordre des Avocats Case - in
which an lawyer from Belgium wanted to practice in France, who we assume as an
example of high skilled workers.) Suppose that the two countries, indexed i = 1 and
2, are producing the same output, according to the same technological function:
qi = AL
α
i H
1−α
i (4.1)
where L and H denote the low- and high-skill labor, respectively.
For simplicity, we shall assume that these two types of labor are the only inputs
in production. With fixed endowments of L and H, outputs are determined in each
country according to (4.1).
When labor cannot move across the borders, competitive labor markets and
profit maximization conditions in each country imply wages be equal to marginal
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productivity:
wLi = αAL
α−1
i H
1−α
i wHi = (1− α)ALαi H−αi (4.2)
Therefore, the wage in Country 1 for L-labor is larger than the wage in Country
2 for H-labor if
wL1 = αAL
α−1
1 H
1−α
1 > αAL
α−1
2 H
1−α
2 = wL2
which simplifies to:
wL1 > wL2 if
H1
L1
>
H2
L2
(4.3)
That is, the wage for low-skill labor is larger in Country 1 if low-skill labor is
relatively scarce in that country. It is easy to check that (4.3) is analogous to the
statement
wH1 > wH2 if
H1
L1
>
H2
L2
Therefore, if H1
L1
> H2
L2
and labor movement is free, then low-skill labor will flow
from Country 1 to Country 2 whereas high-skill labor will also move, in the opposite
direction.
The process of labor movement will be beneficial to both countries and it will
continue as long as relative labor endowments are unequal. This is so, because the
process will go on until the ratios Hi
Li
are equalized in both countries. It is possible
to show that any allocation of H and L inputs such that the total outputs of the two
countries are maximal has equal ratios of Hi
Li
.
Whatever prevents the freedom of location for the two types of labor force is
detrimental in this simple model, where externalities and public goods are absent.
In practice, there are many reasons why factor ratios may not be equalized
across the countries. One of these is the presence of lobbying groups working to
block free movement of labor. Using (4.2), we can write the relative wage of each
labor type in Country 1 as:
wLi
wHi
=
αHi
(1− α)Li
Thus for example, if H1
L1
> H2
L2
free movement of labor will lead to a fall in the
relative wage of L-type workers in country one and a fall in the wages of H-type
workers in Country 2. These groups will oppose free movement of labor.
A second parameter which may block the way of the transfer of labor is the
cost involved in moving from one country to the other. In our model we assume that
movement of labors is costless. However in real life, movement of people is costly,
few people took the advantage of the free movement. The factors which prevents
people from moving can be summarized as: social (the wish not to move without
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their families); economic (the fear of losing entitlements to social benefits, especially
pensions, if individuals moved out of their home states); cultural (the familiarity and
enjoyment of the way of life in their own states); and linguistic (individuals often
lacked the necessary language skills).[3]
Also there is an important distinction between thinking the migrants as ”factor
of production” and as a citizen of the Union. With the introduction of ”Citizenship
of the European Union” concept by the Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992 (every
person holding the nationality of a member state shall be a citizen of the Union) the
decisions of the Court started to change, started to give a more freestanding right
to move. The concept of citizenship gives more importance to the principle of equal
treatment. Also the rights given to the people change with the duration of stay.
4.2 The Reference Cases
As we also did in Chapter 3, we will mention some of the reference cases which
created a basis for most of the articles, and became reference.
4.2.1 Maria Martinez Sala v Freistaat Bayern
Maria Martinez Sala v Freistaat Bayern Case2 is the hint of a first significant
breakthrough towards the judical recognition of the potency of the citizenship pro-
visions as a means of enhancing the legal protection of individuals[19]. The Court
decided that any national of a Member State residing in another Member State’s ter-
ritory falls within the scope of the Treaty provisions on European Citizenship. This
removed the possibility of discrimination on the grounds of nationality. This decision
is an important turning point because it changed the reasoning behind having the
same rights with the nationals of the host country. Access to benefits was based
on active economic status before, after this it became connected to the concept of
citizenship. Sala may prove to be the key ruling that breaks the ground between the
orthodoxy of economic rights for economic actors and it will open up new horizons
of comprehensive rights to equal treatment for Union citizens[19].
2Case C-85/96 [1998]
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4.2.2 Reyners v Belgian State
Reyners v Belgian State Case3 is an example of the rule against discrimination.
A Dutch national who is living in Belgium, has a Belgian legal qualification. Au-
thorities denied his admission as an advocate in Belgium, because there were rules
restricting this profession to foreigners. He argued that he has the right to estab-
lish himself in Belgium. Even if there were rules against discrimination on grounds
of nationality, there were exceptions for the activities directly affecting the exercise
of official authority. Reyners was subject to conditions different than regular Bel-
gians. Even if the free movement was facilitated, the rule of equal treatment was
independently enforceable.
4.2.3 Thieffry v Conseil de l’Ordre des Avocats
Thieffry v Conseil de l’Ordre des Avocats4 is another example of discrimination
cases. Here is a Belgian holding a Belgian doctorate in law who wanted to practice in
France applied for registration. His application has been rejected by the Paris Bar,
not because of his nationality as in the Reyners case, but because of his diploma
was not satisfying the required French qualifications. The European Court, asked to
make a preliminary ruling which includes freedom of establishment. Specifically, it is
impermissible to restrict a national diploma where the individual holds a qualification
recognized by competent national authorities (here the University of Paris I had
recognized his Belgian qualification as equivalent to the French qualification) as
equivalent to the required national diploma[19].
3Case 2/74 [1974]
4Case 71/76 [1977]
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, our main aim was discussing the effects of liberalization of trade
and free movement of labors inside the European Union. For this purpose we gave
background information about EU Law and economic approach of law; the process
of European economic integration; the idea of single market and the concept of four
freedoms. We also explained couple of decisions of European Court of Justice, for
showing the real life examples. We especially focused on the concept of intellectual
property rights in the third chapter, since it is an important challenge to the EU,
and an important discussion on the free movement of goods. The fourth chapter
was about the free movement of workers, services and right of establishment. The
methodology for both chapters was modeling the situation with a basic economic
model, a discussion about the welfare implications of the freedoms, followed by some
examples of the reference cases.
In the first chapter, after giving the outline of the thesis, we have started with
the description of concept of law and economics; and the basic reasoning behind the
research topics of this field. We mentioned the main criticisms on law and economics,
especially on normative law and economics. Normative law and economics faces all
the basic criticism which mainstream economic theory faces, since it uses the main
principles of theory for constructing policy recommendations.
Moreover, we continued with a summary of background information about EU
law making, its historical progress through treaties. We gave a detailed explanation
about primary, secondary and case law, mentioned their progress and explained their
institutional base.
In the second chapter, titled Creation of Single Market and the Concept of Four
Freedoms, we gave some historical information about the creation of single market.
We enumerated the steps for further economic integration starting from 1952. We
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also explained different stages of integration shortly. After that we also defined the
concept of four freedoms.
Chapter 3 titled On the Free Movement of Goods, started with our reference
model: Ricardian Comparative Advantage Model. Here first we simply modeled
free movement of goods then discussed the welfare improving effects of free trade.
We used indifference curves in this analysis, while also explaining trade creation
and trade diversion effects. This chapter continued with reference cases. Second
part of this chapter is about the importance of intellectual property rights, some
basic cases about this concept and simple modeling for many situations possible in
a patent right holding issue. We formally argued the arbitrage conditions and the
importance, length and extent of the patent rights for encouraging more scientific
research. We concluded that authorities play a crucial role while defining these rights,
because protection of the balance between the Member States and proper operating
competitive markets are tremendously important. We also gave examples from case
law here as well.
Chapter 4 titled On the Free Movement of Workers, Freedom of Establishment
and Free Movement of Services again with a reference model. In this model we
showed the beneficial effects of movement of both high and low skilled labors. Even
if we showed it as a welfare improving situation, movement of people is a much more
deeper discussion topic. Before that we have to mention the perspective towards
free movement of people significantly changed with the introduction of the concept
of European Citizenship with Maastricht Treaty. Before the Treaty countries were
welcoming only economically active citizens, with this concept all nationals of the
Member States started to have same rights everywhere inside the Union. Most of the
cases in this field are based on the discussions about discriminations on the grounds
of nationality. Migration has many effects such as social, cultural and linguistic,
and requires deeper policies than just economic adjustments. After discussing these
issues shortly, we gave examples of some cases as well.
In conclusion, even if free trade and free movement of factors of production seem
welfare improving with an economic theoretical background; governments and supra-
national authorities of the European Union play a crucial role here. In mainstream
economic theory, liberalization of trade is always assumed as welfare improving. We
always ”assume” markets will work effectively, and figure out the optimum alloca-
tion for all. This claim is also accepted as valid for the free movement of workers;
salaries will be equalized at the optimum level. However in real life, these issues are
more complicated than this, require more discussion. Trade relations between coun-
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tries needs a lot of rules and regulations (especially for an entity like the European
Union). The main reason behind the focus on intellectual property rights is to show
the necessity of regulations for some conditions. We explained that the need for
reasonably defined policies is so crucial for supporting innovation. However not dis-
tracting competition while encouraging new and valuable innovation is so important
as well. It is a hard discussion topic even for a single country, it is a huge literature
for the European Union.
In this thesis, we mentioned some of the basic issues about single market and
the concept of four freedoms with an economical approach. For further work, more
cases can be used as reference, more attention can be made on competition law. Also
there are other discussion points about single market and about it’s welfare impli-
cations. Nowadays, because of the global financial crises, protectionist tendencies
are important discussions as well. In general, welfare effects of economic integration
(not only for the EU but also in general) can be argued much more in detail. As a
candidate country, more work is also needed for the impacts of economic integration
of Turkey to the EU.
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